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This has been no ordinary year. As I write, 
we face profound uncertainties. We have 
seen political events that will alter our 
nation’s future, in ways that are hard to 
fathom. We are in the grip of a global 
pandemic, whose long-term effects are 
unclear. We are learning new ways to teach 
and do philosophy together, while apart.
We are especially fortunate, at this time, 
to be able to welcome our new Bertrand 
Russell Professor, Alexander Bird, who takes 
up this role in October 2020.
This Professorship was established in 
1896, and acquired its present name in 
2010, after a successful fundraising appeal 
to endow the post. It has been held by 
Moore, Wittgenstein, von Wright, Wisdom, 
and Anscombe, and more recently by Hugh 
Mellor, Simon Blackburn, and Huw Price—
who, I’m glad to say, will stay at Cambridge, 
as Director of the Leverhulme Centre for 
the Future of Intelligence (see pp. 4–5).
Alexander Bird, Bertrand Russell Professor from 1 October 2020
Alexander works in metaphysics, 
epistemology, philosophy of science, 
and philosophy of medicine. He will be 
speaking at the Cambridge Alumni Festival 
2020, on ‘Romanticism, Creativity and the 
Replication Crisis’ (see panel). Romanticism 
elevates the ‘unfettered imagination’, and 
deprecates the ‘cold reason’ of science, 
but he questions this perspective. Is the 
unfettered imagination a good thing? 
Is scientific judgment unimaginative? 
He responds from a surprising angle: 
‘Curiously, the replication crisis in 
biomedicine and psychology suggests 
otherwise.’  We look forward to seeing 
many of our readers there.
Bertrand Russell’s History of Western 
Philosophy was my own introduction to 
philosophy, as a teenager, inspiring me 
to ask questions, and face uncertainties. 
It seems a good year to let Russell have 
the last word: ‘To teach how to live 
without certainty, and yet without being 
paralysed by hesitation, is perhaps the 
chief thing that philosophy, in our age, 
can still do for those who study it.’ 
Late news: we recently announced, with 
great sadness, the death of Hugh Mellor 
1938–2020, 21 June https://www.phil.
cam.ac.uk/news/mellor-announcement. 
If readers wish to share a memory or 
a tribute, please write to the following 
address: remembering.hugh.mellor@
gmail.com. With your permission, we 
may draw on your message for the next 
Newsletter, and for a commemoration 
event planned for 2021. 
Faculty Events
30th Alumni Festival 2020
Tuesday 22 September, 12:30pm-
1:30pm (online) ‘Romanticism, 
Creativity and the Replication Crisis’ 
with Alexander Bird
Friday 25 September, 6:30pm-7:30pm 
(online) ‘Newnham Conversation: 
Democracy and Digital Technologies’ 
with Onora O’Neill and Rae Langton
For further information and booking 
go to https://www.alumni.cam.ac.uk/
Festival
Festival of Ideas 2020
For further information go to  
www.festivalofideas.cam.ac.uk
For information about future Faculty 
events go to https://www.phil.cam.
ac.uk/events-phil
Rae Langton is Knightbridge 
Professor in the Faculty of Philosophy. 
Email: rhl27@cam.ac.uk.
The Birth of a Book 
Michael Potter
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I recently published a book, but it was not 
originally my idea to write it. What now 
seems a very long time ago (in 2012, in 
fact) Andy Beck at Routledge asked me to 
write a history of analytic philosophy. He 
had picked up on the fact that although 
an increasing number of philosophy 
departments offer courses on this subject, 
there are very few textbooks suitable for 
such courses. What Andy wanted, though, 
was a single textbook that covered the 
whole subject from Bolzano to the present 
day. I rejected this idea for two reasons: it 
was too ambitious, at least for me, requiring 
knowledge of authors of whom I have 
never made a detailed study; and it was 
so broad that its coverage of each author 
would inevitably be superficial. I was not 
really interested in writing what would 
be likely to be little more than a series of 
encyclopaedia articles.
But Andy persisted, we talked again, 
and I eventually agreed after some 
prevarication to write a much more 
narrowly focussed book with just 
four parts: on Frege, Russell, the early 
Wittgenstein and Ramsey. Each of these 
four parts would be long enough that I 
would have room to develop my own 
interpretation, and to go in some detail 
into their distinctive contribution to  
the subject.
The main doubt Andy raised at that 
point (guided by expert reviewers he 
consulted about my plan) was whether 
there should also be a part on Moore. There 
is no doubting that Moore was important 
historically in British philosophy in the first 
half of the 20th century (although part 
of the explanation for this importance 
must, I think, be that he possessed a sort 
of charisma that does not transfer well to 
the written page). In the end, though, I 
persuaded my publisher to let me omit him. 
This was partly because his voice would 
not be completely silent: he could be heard 
over Russell’s shoulder, nudging him into 
many of the views he adopted between 
1898 and about 1912 (the conception of 
propositions as containing parts of the 
world, the identity theory of truth, the 
sense-datum theory). But Moore’s omission 
was also for the more selfish reason that 
I just do not enjoy reading him. I feared 
that as a result anything I wrote about him 
would lack the degree of sympathy that is 
required if one is to engage properly with a 
philosopher’s thinking.
When I signed the contract in 2014, my 
plan was to dash the book off fairly quickly 
(quickly for me, anyway), so that it could 
come out in 2016. After all, I figured that I 
knew this stuff pretty well, having already 
written a book 20 years ago that discussed 
all four of my authors (although then with 
a slightly narrower focus on the philosophy 
of arithmetic). When I settled down to 
write, however, my original timetable soon 
fell apart. I discovered that almost every 
chapter threw up issues that I had not 
properly thought through before. And each 
time, there was a large secondary literature 
that I needed to look at, even if only to 
disagree with it.
The result was that I did not submit a 
final version until midway through 2019, 
over three years late. I probably would 
not have submitted it even then if it had 
not been for the Cambridge Faculty’s 
decision to introduce a new paper on 
the history of analytic philosophy in Part 
IB of the Tripos in 2019-2020. It would 
have been embarrassing if the main 
textbook for the new course had not 
been available.
The project took much longer to write 
than I had originally planned, then, but it 
also ended up being a lot longer—200k 
rather than the 130k I had originally agreed. 
When I told Andy this, he quite reasonably 
demanded that I convince him the length 
really was necessary. But he then accepted 
it with good grace (and, I am pleased to 
say, priced the paperback edition of the 
book competitively).
The title we eventually agreed on for the 
book was The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 
1879-1930 (publishers like titles to be as 
explicit as possible, presumably to increase 
the chance that they will come up high 
in Google searches). The initial date of the 
period of study was easy to determine, of 
course. Anyone who read for the Philosophy 
Tripos will know that 1879 was the year 
Frege published Begriffsschrift, the book 
which inaugurated the modern era in 
formal logic. The appropriate end point  
was a little less determinate, but I chose  
the death of Ramsey in 1930. This allowed 
me to include Russell’s post-war neutral 
monism (a position which, curiously, has 
become fashionable again quite recently, 
after being re-discovered by modern 
philosophers of mind).
What did I learn through writing the 
book? The biggest pay-off for me was 
the sense I got of the development of 
the thinking of each of my authors. One 
of the most exciting things one can get 
from studying an author is the sense that 
one is understanding the problems they 
were working on from the inside, so that 
their next steps seem almost inevitable. 
It is remarkable how often a text that had 
previously seemed impenetrable begins to 
yield its meaning in this way.
The second thing I got was a conviction 
that my original choice of focus for the book 
had been the right one. Again and again I 
found resonances which gave the book a 
thematic unity belying its division into four 
distinct parts. Perhaps the most prominent 
of these unifying themes goes directly back 
to the famous paragraph from section 9 
of Begriffsschrift in which Frege explained 
how the variables that occur in quantified 
expressions arise:
If, in an expression (whose content 
need not be assertible), a simple or 
a complex symbol occurs in one 
or more places and we imagine it 
as replaceable by another (but the 
same one each time) at all or some 
of these places, then we call the 
part of the expression that shows 
itself invariant a function and the 
replaceable part its argument. 
Starting from the sentence ‘Cato killed Cato’, 
for instance, we can remove one occurrence 
of ‘Cato’ to obtain the function ‘x killed Cato’, 
Im
age courtesy of Routledge
Michael Potter is Professor of 
Philosophy in the Faculty.
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then remove the other to obtain ‘x killed 
y’, or we can remove both occurrences of 
‘Cato’ at once to obtain ‘x killed x’. Then, 
once we have obtained a function in this 
way, we can apply quantifiers in the now- 
familiar manner. Section 9 thus embodied 
an important insight, namely that the 
letters (x, y, z, etc.) that our notation for 
quantification employs are not variable 
names but a device for marking argument 
places. Frege’s mistake, though, was to think 
he could base the whole of logic on this 
single insight. This led him to his mistaken 
assimilation of sentences to singular 
terms (criticised in the Tractatus), and to 
his mistaken view (criticised by Ramsey in 
‘Universals’) that the structure of atomic 
sentences should be analysed on the 
model of section 9. It also, less obviously 
but more damagingly, underpinned 
Frege’s paralysis in the face of the set-
theoretic paradoxes when he learnt of 
them from Russell’s famous letter of 1902.
Above all, though, I am pleased to 
report that writing the book left intact my 
respect for the philosophical abilities of 
the four authors I had chosen to focus on. 
The history of philosophy is not merely 
the history of ideas. We study authors not 
just because of the significance of their 
influence on subsequent developments, 
but also because we hope to learn from 
them by engaging critically with their 
thoughts. We participate in arguments 
with the minor complication that one 
of the parties to the argument is now 
dead. For that to be worthwhile, we 
have to pick our subjects selectively. The 
mark of the truly first-rate philosopher is 
that even their mistakes are interesting. 
All four of my chosen subjects—Frege, 
Russell, Wittgenstein and Ramsey—made 
interesting mistakes.
Faculty and Staff News
Welcome to Alexander Bird who has been elected to the 
Bertrand Russell Professorship from 1 October 2020. He joined 
the Faculty earlier on 1 July 2020, as Director of Research,  
part-time (see p. 1).
Huw Price will be retiring at the end of September as Bertrand 
Russell Professor, but will continue in his role as Director of  
the Leverhulme Centre for the Future of Intelligence (see  
pp. 1, 4–5).
Welcome also to:
Antara Haldar as Marie Skłodowska-Curie Research Fellow from 
September 2019
Maiya Jordan as British Academy Postdoctoral Fellow from 
November 2020
Jacopo Domenicucci, who has been appointed to a Junior 
Research Fellowship at Emmanuel College, Cambridge
Lucy McDonald, who has been appointed to a Junior Research 
Fellowship at St John’s College, Cambridge
Matthew Simpson, who has been appointed to a Junior 
Research Fellowship at Robinson College, Cambridge
Dan Williams, who has been appointed to a Junior Research 
Fellowship at Corpus Christi College, Cambridge
Promotions, Honours and Awards
Congratulations to Clare Chambers, who has been appointed 
as a Member of the Nuffield Council on Bioethics.
People
Congratulations to Rae Langton, who was awarded an  
honorary doctorate by the University of Klagenfurt in January 2020 
(see pp. 6–7).
Congratulations and farewell to:
Ori Beck who has been appointed to Postdoctoral Fellowship at 
Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
Anastasia Berg who has been appointed to a Lectureship at the 
Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Matthew Leisinger who has been appointed as Assistant 
Professor at the Department of Philosophy, University of York
Maarten Steenhagen who has been appointed to a Research 
Fellowship at Uppsala University
Karina Vold who has been appointed as Assistant Professor at 
University of Toronto’s Institute for the History and Philosophy of 
Science and Technology
Student News
Congratulations to Senthuran Bhuvanendra, who won the 
Emanuel Miller Prize in the Philosophy of Science for his paper 
‘Objectivity through Second-personal Intersubjectivity: Justifying 
Interpretation in the Behavioural Sciences’.
Congratulations to Sahanika Ratnayake, who received an 
honourable mention for the 2020 Jaspers Award by the Association 
for the Advancement of Philosophy and Psychiatry, for ‘It’s 
Been Utility All Along: An Alternate Understanding of Cognitive 
Behavioural Therapy and The Depressive Realism Hypothesis’.
Your comments and suggestions are always welcome. Please send them to Jo Harcus, Editor, at: Faculty of Philosophy, 
Sidgwick Avenue, Cambridge CB3 9DA. Email: jmh225@cam.ac.uk.
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Two Projects from 2012 – a progress report
Huw Price
When Tim Crane interviewed me for the 
Faculty Newsletter in 2012, I mentioned a 
couple of projects I had in my head. One 
was a conference I was organising with our 
(then) Faculty colleague, Fraser MacBride. The 
other was a collaboration with Skype founder 
Jaan Tallinn, to try to establish a centre in 
Cambridge to study catastrophic risks of 
powerful new technologies, such as AI and 
synthetic biology. 
Happily—and mainly due to hard work by 
other people—both projects thrived in ways 
I simply couldn’t have imagined in 2012. I 
want to take this opportunity to thank some 
of those people, claim a little bit of inventor’s 
credit for their success, and explain how the 
second project changed my life.
Both projects began in 2011, in the months 
before I arrived in Cambridge from Sydney. 
At that point, Tim and Heather alerted me to 
a new University strategic fund for research 
in the humanities. Fraser and I were both 
interested in Cambridge philosophy in the 
1920s, and in what we saw a thread running 
through the work of many Cambridge 
philosophers since that time—as we put it, 
a kind of pragmatism. Pragmatists approach 
philosophical problems by enquiring about 
the practical role of disputed notions—truth, 
causation, value, or necessity, for example—
in human life. Over the past century, many 
distinguished Cambridge philosophers have 
been pragmatists in one sense or another. 
In a spirit of cheeky chauvinism, we called 
this ‘Cambridge Pragmatism’. The name 
was cheeky on three counts. First, not all 
the Cambridge philosophers in our sights, 
by any means, thought of themselves as 
pragmatists. Second, the same thread could 
be found in other places, including the 
Other Place. And third, most egregiously, 
there’s another Cambridge, where other 
philosophers had claimed the term 
Pragmatism, long before the ideas we had 
in mind—or their local authors, in many 
cases—had even been conceived.
So Fraser and I were risking egg on our 
cheek, especially trans-Atlantic egg—until a 
trans-Atlantic pragmatist turned up to save 
our bacon. Cheryl Misak gave us a remarkable 
paper on the then almost unknown influence 
of the great American Cambridge Pragmatist, 
Charles Pierce, on Frank Ramsey—the first 
and greatest of our Cambridge Pragmatists. 
Thanks to Cheryl, our cheeky term now had 
some intellectual teeth.
Happily, the conference in 2012 was only 
the beginning, from Cheryl’s point of view. 
With the bit firmly between her teeth, her 
paper became the seed of a brilliant book, 
itself called Cambridge Pragmatism, telling 
the full story of what Ramsey’s philosophy 
owes to Pierce. And now, just released this 
Spring, Cheryl has completed her remarkable 
intellectual biography of Ramsey himself, 
Frank Ramsey: A Sheer Excess of Powers. 
You’ll see why I’m pleased to take some 
causal credit for this. (Has any Cambridge 
philosopher ever achieved so much, from 
so little initial effort?). More importantly, I’m 
delighted to have this opportunity to thank 
Cheryl for her remarkable contribution to the 
history of Cambridge philosophy.
The second project also began in the 
summer of 2011, when I got into a taxi in 
Copenhagen with a man I’d never met. I 
hadn’t met him, but I knew who he was. We 
were attending the same conference, which 
had begun three days earlier, on a cruise ship 
in Norway. At the first session, as we sailed 
down the fjord, we’d all had two minutes to 
say who we were, where we came from and 
what we did. So I knew that he was called 
Jaan Tallinn, that he came from Tallinn in 
Estonia—he’d joked about his name being 
the same as his hometown—and that he 
was one of the founders of Skype.
I reminded Jaan who I was—the 
Australian philosopher taking a slow boat 
to Cambridge—and asked him the obvious 
question. What did he do these days (since 
inventing Skype, as it were)? He mentioned 
his day job as an angel investor, but said that 
he spent a lot of his time trying to get people 
to think about ‘AI risk’. I asked him what 
he meant, and he talked about concerns 
that machine intelligence might far exceed 
human intelligence—perhaps soon, and 
perhaps rapidly, once machine intelligence 
becomes self-improving—and that that 
might be bad news for us. 
 I’d heard of these ideas before, but I hadn’t 
met anyone who took them so seriously—
especially someone with his feet so firmly 
on the ground in the computer industry. So 
I was intrigued, both by the ideas and by 
Jaan’s evident commitment to getting other 
people to think about them. 
As it happened, I had a couple of days in 
Jaan’s hometown, just two weeks later. I was 
giving some lectures in Helsinki, and the best 
way to get from there to Cambridge was to 
fly from Tallinn to Stansted. So I suggested 
we continue our conversation there.
It had occurred to me that one of the 
people I already knew in Cambridge was also 
worried about near-term risks to humanity 
from human technology. That person was 
Lord Martin Rees. Martin is one of the UK’s 
most distinguished scientists. He’s a former 
President of the Royal Society, and back in 
2011 was still Master of Trinity College, where 
I was about to take up a Fellowship.
I knew Martin from philosophy of 
cosmology circles, and I knew that he’d been 
writing about risks of modern technology 
for many years. I was wondering whether I 
could act as a catalyst between Martin and 
Jaan. This seemed a fitting role for the new 
Bertrand Russell Professor—Russell himself 
spent the last twenty years of his life trying 
to reduce the risk of human extinction by 
nuclear war.
I discussed these thoughts with Jaan in 
Tallinn, and set out for Cambridge, gripped 
by the thought that Fate was offering me 
an unusual opportunity. She’d already lined 
me up with a wonderful new job. Now she 
seemed to be offering me a chance to use it 
to do something unexpected, and possibly 
important.
With Martin’s encouragement, I brought 
Jaan to Cambridge for a public lecture. 
By the summer of 2012, we were working 
together to establish what we’d agreed to 
call the Centre for the Study of Existential 
Risk, or CSER.
We decided to focus on catastrophic risks 
from new technologies. There are other 
extinction-level risks, such as asteroids, or 
mega-volcanoes. But those risks are low, 
constant, and pretty well understood. In 
contrast, potential technological risks might 
be both higher and rapidly changing, and 
were hardly studied at all. It seemed obvious 
where we should focus our efforts. 
Under the leadership of two remarkable 
Executive Directors, first Dr Seán  
Ó hÉigeartaigh and now Dr Catherine 
Rhodes, CSER has now grown to a team 
of almost twenty researchers. It is highly 
interdisciplinary, with expertise ranging 
from philosophy and law to environmental 
science and biosecurity. It does many 
things, but most important of all, it’s had 
a big impact on the conversation, helping 
existential risk to become a mainstream  
topic rather than a fringe topic.
My conversation with Jaan in that taxi was 
about the risks of AI. CSER isn’t confined to 
AI risk, but it’s the area that’s seen the most 
remarkable change in public attitudes, over 
the past few years. When we first invited 
Jaan to speak in Cambridge, the organisers 
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worried whether the topic was serious 
enough for their Distinguished Lecture series. 
Some thought it was too flaky. No one would 
dream of raising that issue now—everyone 
now wants to discuss the future of AI. 
CSER played a role in this. With the MIT 
Future of Life Institute, we co-organised an 
important conference in Puerto Rico in 2015. 
This helped to build a sense of community 
and common purpose—a sense that people 
were beginning to get on the same page, in 
thinking about the challenges of AI.
The week after that conference, the 
Leverhulme Trust announced a new 
competition for Major Research Centres. 
They wanted big ideas, ideas that had the 
potential to make a difference to the future 
of humanity.
It seemed perfect for us. With partners 
from Oxford, Imperial College, and Berkeley, 
we proposed a Centre to help to create the 
new interdisciplinary community we need 
to think about these issues. It was a long 
process, but the Leverhulme Centre for the 
Future of Intelligence (CFI) was officially 
launched in 2016, pushed off the slipway by 
two Cambridge giants, Stephen Hawking 
and Margaret Boden.
CFI is narrower than CSER in one sense, 
because it is just about AI. It’s broader in 
another sense, in that it is not just about 
risks. Even if we assume that the risks can be 
safely managed, AI will present us with many 
challenges, both short term and long term. 
As Stephen Hawking put it at our launch, 
‘when human-level AI eventually does occur, 
it’s likely to be either the best or worst thing 
ever to happen to humanity, so there’s huge 
value in getting it right.’ And that means 
thinking about the good side as well as the 
bad side—there’s no reason to think that 
the best outcomes will magically fall into our 
laps, if we manage to avoid the worst ones.
CFI, too, has been thriving under the 
leadership of our Executive Director, 
Dr Stephen Cave (himself a Faculty of 
Philosophy alumnus). We have a good claim 
to be the world’s first research centre in the 
new interdisciplinary field of ‘AI Impacts’, 
but similar institutes have since been 
emerging in many parts of the world. CFI 
now works to try to connect the best of these 
institutes, and to encourage cooperation and 
collaboration between them.
Much of my time now goes into these 
efforts, in countries such as Germany, 
Australia, Singapore, and especially China. 
(The slow boat got me there in the end!). 
The most life-changing aspect of this is not 
the travel—philosophy used to provide its 
share of that—but the fact that so much of 
my professional world, and so many of my 
new friends, are not in philosophy. This is 
very mixed news, of course. I’ve been sad to 
Huw Price (Darwin 1977-81) joined 
the Faculty as Bertrand Russell 
Professor in October 2011, and 
retires from that role in September 
2020. He continues in his role as the 
Director of the Leverhulme Centre 
for the Future of Intelligence.
be pulled away from the Faculty in recent 
years. But it’s been a wholly unexpected 
privilege to have this new alternative.
The picture shows me in Singapore 
(obviously) in 2019. I was there for their 
biennial Foresight Conference, and the 
tenth anniversary of the remarkable Centre 
for Strategic Futures (CSF), in the Singapore 
Prime Minister’s Office, who have been 
friends of CSER and CFI for several years. The 
person to whom I seem to be mansplaining 
Singapore is Liana Tang, Deputy Head 
of CSF. I’m actually pointing out a small 
Chinese hotel—remarkably still in 
existence—in which I stayed in 1976, on my 
way to Cambridge as a graduate student. 
For me, by tying together these two visits 
to Singapore, this picture ties together 
two landmarks in my long association with 
Cambridge Philosophy—two milestones, 
more than forty years apart, in one of the 
most fortunate journeys of my life.
Photo: Centre for Strategic Futures, Singapore
Huw Price with Liana Tang, Director of the Centre for Strategic Futures in the Singapore Prime Minister’s Office
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The Enlightening of Maria von Herbert, 
Klagenfurt, 1770–1803
Rae Langton
On 21 January 2020 I was awarded an honorary doctorate by 
the University of Klagenfurt, Austria, partly in recognition of my 
work on the life and letters of Maria von Herbert, a young woman 
who lived in Klagenfurt from 1770-1803, and corresponded with 
Immanuel Kant. I was amazed to receive this honour, but delighted 
to share in the renewed attention to this little-known philosopher 
from Klagenfurt’s history, and to meet philosophers and scholars 
now at Klagenfurt, including Ursula Renz, Oliver Vitouch, and 
Bernhard Ritter, who has significant new findings on Maria and her 
enlightenment circle.
Immanuel Kant said that enlightenment, Aufklärung, or 
enlightening, is about growing up, and thinking for ourselves (‘What 
is Enlightenment?’1784). It is the emergence of human beings from 
self-imposed infancy or immaturity, the inability to use our own 
understanding without guidance. This is self-imposed when it is lazy 
or cowardly, hence the Enlightenment motto, sapere aude, ‘dare to 
know!’ But it can be imposed by others, who make independence 
‘seem hard and dangerous to most people’, indeed ‘the entire fair sex’, 
said Kant: we are made into stupid cattle, prevented from taking a 
single step without leading-strings, and shown dangers that would 
threaten, if we should try to walk by ourselves.
Kant’s remark about ‘the entire fair sex’ was not quite right. Sadly, 
he missed the brilliance and independent judgement of Maria von 
Herbert, who, in 1791, wrote him an impassioned letter from her 
small outpost of the enlightenment:
“Great Kant,
As a believer calls to his God, I call to you for help, for comfort, or for 
counsel to prepare me for death. Your writings prove that there is 
a future life. But as for this life, I have found nothing, nothing at all 
that could replace the good I have lost, for I loved someone who, in 
my eyes, encompassed within himself all that is worthwhile, so that 
I lived only for him, everything else was in comparison just rubbish, 
cheap trinkets. Well, I have offended this person, because of a long 
drawn out lie, which I have now disclosed to him, though there 
was nothing unfavourable to my character in it, I had no vice in my 
life that needed hiding. The lie was enough though, and his love 
vanished. As an honourable man, he doesn’t refuse me friendship. 
But that inner feeling that once, unbidden, led us to each other, is no 
more—oh my heart splinters into a thousand pieces! If I hadn’t read 
so much of your work I would certainly have put an end to my life. But 
the conclusion I had to draw from your theory stops me—it is wrong 
for me to die because my life is tormented, instead I’m supposed to 
live because of my being. Now put yourself in my place, and either 
damn me or comfort me. I’ve read the metaphysic of morals, and the 
categorical imperative, and it doesn’t help a bit. My reason abandons 
me just when I need it. Answer me, I implore you—or you won’t be 
acting in accordance with your own imperative.”
Maria was asking for advice, which Kant noticed, and he kindly 
wrote back to her with a ‘sermon’ about lies and friendship. Maria 
was also thinking for herself, which Kant did not notice. In this and 
subsequent letters, we find a critique of Kant’s philosophy bursting 
with insight, and an audacity that makes you laugh out loud. She 
writes of honesty, deceit, suicide, and the limits of Kantian ethics. 
She has read Kant’s work, ‘and it doesn’t help a bit’. She finds a life 
lived by Kantian ethics to be an ‘empty and vegetating’ life. Kant 
did not notice this either. And when Kant was told of the scandal 
behind her ‘lie’, he did not make up his own mind. It seems she 
had failed to tell her ‘friend’ about a previous lover. So Kant gave 
up on Maria, describing her to others as a kleine Schwärmerin, an 
ecstatical little dreamer, whose letters had value, not as philosophy, 
but as a ‘warning of the perils’ of sexual love. He sent her letters, thus 
advertised, to another young woman, since that after all is what 
young women need—warning and protection, not philosophy. 
He told the recipient to ignore the philosophy in the letters: Maria, 
he said, had ‘a curious mental derangement’, and ‘a number of 
expressions refer to writings of mine that she read, and are difficult 
to understand without an interpreter’. Kant did his small part to 
prevent the enlightenment fully reaching Maria, and to deny himself, 
and others, the opportunity of learning from her own share of that 
light. He did not censor her, but he silenced her, and disempowered 
her. This teaches us something about freedom, and silence, and its 
conditions. Maria’s story is remarkable, and ultimately tragic. I can’t 
tell it here, but I will say that when I discovered her letters, I was 
bowled over, and they drew me into moral philosophy.
Klagenfurt is still a centre or outpost of the Enlightenment, I 
found. The University ‘stands in the great European tradition of the 
Enlightenment’, according to their unabashed mission statement. 
Klagenfurt has taken a leading role in the building of ‘Universities for 
Enlightenment’, a band of Central European universities who have 
joined together to promote their shared commitments, and combat 
new and different threats. They issued ‘The Vienna Statement’ in 
December 2018, a stinging condemnation of the Hungarian 
government’s attack on the Central European University. As many 
readers will know, the CEU has been effectively closed down and 
evicted, forced to move from Budapest, though it is finding a new 
camp in Vienna. Many readers will know that Philosophy at CEU has 
strong associations with Cambridge. Gabòr Betegh has come from 
CEU to be Laurence Professor of Ancient Philosophy. Katalin Farkas, 
who has served as Provost and Pro-Rector of CEU, was recently a 
Maria von Herbert 
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research visitor in the Faculty and at Newnham College. Tim Crane, 
my predecessor as Knightbridge Professor, now leads the CEU 
Philosophy Department.
This brings us to larger questions about the role of a University, 
and what, if anything, ‘enlightenment’ could possibly mean for 
us now. Is a University a ‘post-truth’ institution? Should we raise 
our hands in the air? Should we foster sophisticated scepticism? 
Let us hope we can do better than that. Now, more than 
ever, we face challenges that call on us, with new urgency, to 
Philosophy and the Cambridge-LMU 
Partnership
Cambridge and the Ludwig Maximilian University launched a 
major Strategic Partnership in 2019, building on strong prior 
collaborations. ‘No single institution can provide, on its own, the 
answers to the great challenges of these turbulent times’, said 
our Vice-Chancellor, Stephen Toope, announcing the initiative. 
‘Collaboration and openness to the world are essential to achieving 
our academic and civic missions. Our partnership with LMU, one of 
Europe’s finest universities, creates exciting opportunities to work 
together to address tough issues and provide our students with a 
richer education.’ Such partnerships have special significance in a 
post-Brexit landscape, underlining and strengthening our teaching 
and research relationships with our peer institutions.
The Philosophy Faculty welcomed this venture with open arms, 
proposing four projects, all of which won support. Richard Holton 
(with Nora Heinzelmann, LMU) proposed the Cambridge-LMU 
Moral Psychology Group, investigating such topics as empathy, 
addiction, and self-control, with participants from Philosophy (Rae 
Langton, Paulina Sliwa), Psychology, Psychiatry, and Neuroscience. 
We are about to join forces with Classics, led by Gabòr Betegh 
(with Christof Rapp at LMU), looking next at the moral psychology 
of persuasion. Huw Price (with Stephan Hartmann, LMU) 
proposed a project on ‘Decision Theory and the Future of Artificial 
Intelligence’, drawing together researchers from CFI and LMU. 
Angela Breitenbach (with Axel Hutter, LMU) proposed a network 
that brings together Kant and Philosophy of Science, with a focus 
on originality and creativity in the sciences. And Jeremy Butterfield 
(with Erik Curiel, LMU) proposed a project in philosophy of physics, 
which is going to solve ‘Foundational Problems in Black Hole 
Thermodynamics and Semi-Classical Gravity’. We look forward to 
the next chapters of these collaborations.
remember our shared commitments, that span far across times, 
and far across borders.
Note. The quoted letter is slightly abridged. Parts of this article 
draw on Rae Langton’s Hulsean Sermon, given at Great St. Mary’s 
on 23 February (coincidentally the first Hulsean Sermon after Brexit, 
and the last before the coronavirus outbreak). For more on Maria 
von Herbert’s letters and story see ‘Duty and Desolation’ Philosophy 
67 available at https:\\cambridge.academia.edu/RaeLangton.
Professor Rae Langton with Professor Dr. Oliver Vitouch, Rector, at the award ceremony 
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Perceptual Confidence Workshop
Jessie Munton
Is your perceptual experience of the 
world all or nothing, or does it come 
in degrees? It’s (fairly) uncontroversial 
that the beliefs we form on the basis of 
our perceptual experience can be more 
or less confident, but what about the 
perceptual experience itself? How much 
uncertainty is there in it? What form  
does that uncertainty take?
These were some of the questions 
explored at a workshop held at St John’s 
College, Cambridge from the 5 to 7 
August 2019, that brought together 
philosophers and neuroscientists from 
nine different universities to try to make 
some headway on the nature of our 
perceptual experience. In the past, John 
Morrison (Barnard College, Columbia 
University) and I have separately argued 
in favour of the view that perceptual 
experience itself can present its content 
with more or less confidence, whilst 
most other parties had written critically 
of that view. 
The workshop kicked off with a 
talk from John Morrison, presenting 
some new work arguing in support 
of perceptual confidence on the 
basis of neuroscientific evidence. His 
talk was followed by two talks from 
neuroscientists. Chris Fetsch, from John 
Hopkins University, presented a range 
of relevant experimental work, whilst 
Rachel Denison from NYU delved more 
deeply into the relationship between 
theoretical models of visual perception 
and our visual phenomenology: can we 
read off what our visual experience is 
like from our theoretical models of how 
it is generated? ‘Probably not’ was her 
cautious conclusion. We then took a turn 
up the tower of St John’s chapel to admire 
the view: Ely Cathedral was just visible 
in the distance, its spire and the distant 
fields presented with a lower degree of 
perceptual confidence than the clearly 
visible roofs of the nearby colleges.
Refuelled by dinner at the Punter, 
(funded by York University), we 
reconvened the next day for two talks 
that explored the different kinds of 
indeterminacy and uncertainty we find in 
perceptual experience, from Jonna Vance 
(Northern Arizona University), and from 
Steven Gross (Johns Hopkins). In the last 
talk of the day, Susanna Siegel struck a 
more critical note, putting pressure on 
the claim that the view is well motivated 
from within perceptual epistemology in 
particular. Li Li Tan (Cambridge) and Tom 
McClelland (also Cambridge) then led 
a round-table discussion to round out 
the day. The final day of talks continued 
to focus on perceptual epistemology, 
with Jake Beck (York University, Toronto) 
and Alex Byrne (MIT) offering some 
incisive criticisms, before I decisively 
refuted them all in a final talk arguing 
in favour of perceptual confidence. E. J. 
Green (MIT) then led a final roundtable, 
bringing together some of the different 
strands of discussion and critique that 
had arisen over the previous three days. 
Some of the participants then tried their 
hand at punting, with varying degrees 
of success. A final dinner at Stem and 
Glory was funded by Barnard College. The 
conference was a family-friendly affair, 
with some participants and attendees 
bringing children and partners, including 
to some of the sessions and the evening 
dinners. We were very grateful to St John’s 
College, who provided us with a beautiful 
setting, and further financial support. One 
lasting regret is that one of our scheduled 
speakers, Anya Farennikova (CUNY), 
was unable to come due to difficulties 
securing a visa.
I’d love to be able to say that the 
participants felt they had made 
tangible progress on the issue or 
reached any kind of greater consensus, 
but I’m restricted here by the general 
agreement that there is some kind of 
truth norm of assertion. For the most 
part, everyone ended the workshop 
more certain of their existing views 
than they had been before. One point 
of agreement that did emerge was 
the difficulty of deciding questions 
concerning the nature of perceptual 
phenomenology: empirical work on its 
own, without a theoretical framework 
within which to interpret it, isn’t able 
to offer a clear answer, and simple 
reflection on our own perceptual 
phenomenology is also surprisingly 
inconclusive. That’s an odd feature of the 
discussion: questions that bear on the 
nature of your perceptual experience 
ought to be easy to settle: just a bit of 
introspection should be all that’s needed 
to find out if your perceptual experience 
comes in degrees! But even after days 
of careful discussion and reflection, 
deep disagreements remained between 
the participants. But perhaps you can 
help us, dear reader! As you hold this 
page further towards the periphery of 
your visual field, what changes occur 
in your visual experience? What kind of 
theoretical framework do you think we 
need in order to capture that? 
Jessie Munton is University Lecturer 
in the Faculty.
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